Abstract. This paper take Intelligent sharing bicycle company Mobike for example, first introduce the current situation of Mobike, then establishes a complete information static game model for the fixed amount subsidy strategy and the fixed proportion subsidy strategy, and analyzes its strategic equilibrium solution and reasonable price range, get conclusion that Mobike company expand the market share through the subsidy in the short term, but it cannot be maintained for a long time and needs diversification the profitability approach.
. IF no subsidies, the price of Mobike generally higher than the other, so the price utility is negative.
The Complete Information Static Game of the Fixed Subsidy Policy
The Utility Analysis Assuming Mobike subsidies S to the user, S<P, The user use the bicycle price for P 1 =P-S, user numbers for Q 1 =a-bP 1 = a-b(P-S), The company's profits for R 1 =P 1 Q 1 =(P-S)[a-b(P-S)]=a(P-S)-b(P-S) 2 (1) The cost of subsidies for the company C 1 =Q 1 S=[a-b(P-S)]S (2) And the company's economic interests D 1 =R 1 -C 1 =a(P-S)-b(P-S) 2 -[a-b(P-S)]S=aP-2aS-bP 2 2bS 2 +3PSb (3) IF Mobike give users no subsidies, S=0, the interests of the company is
If Mobike company give users subsidies but users do not choose it, and choose other similar public bike, the company's economic interests -C 1 =-Q 1 S<0.If Mobike do not give users subsidies, and the user don't choose the bicycle, the company's economic interests is 0.
User Utility Analysis
When the user selects the bike and the Mobike company give users subsidies, because the price effect is negative, so the user's utility is U total , the user to select the Mobike for the convenience and comfort of the utility is greater than the difference between the two prices, and can make up for extra price, the user will choose Mobike first ;On the contrary, the users choose other public bicycle way.
The company chose not to subsidies to the user, the user needs to compare U total mo -U 1 mo and U total other -U 1 other the effectiveness of its size, reasoning and the above conclusion.
Equilibrium Strategy Analysis
When U total mo -U total other >U 1 mo -U 1 other , And 2(a b ) 3b
, Models have unique equilibrium solution (not subsidies, the use of), The user a good riding habit, and Mobike convenience, comfort, etc are more satisfied, no additional subsidies will first choose this kind of short-distance travel way, at this point the bicycle to get the best economic benefits, we are looking for the optimal Nash equilibrium. , Model has only one Nash equilibrium (subsidies, use), The user will choose the bicycle if the Mobike company chose to subsidies, the company income, but need to pay cost of subsidies, so the company earnings are smaller.
When U total mo -U total other <U 1 mo -U 1 other , Users will not choose to use the bicycle, the best choice of Mobike is not subsidies, have unique Nash equilibrium (not subsidies, do not use) [5] , leads to the companies operating difficulties and even can't live, the equilibrium solution is worthless.
The Complete Information Static Game of the Fixed Proportion Subsidy Policy
The Utility Analysis Now consider Mobike company subsidies users in the price of a certain proportion, Assuming the proportion is t, 0<t<1, Subsidies is tP, The user use the bicycle price P 2 =P-tP=(1-t)P, user numbers Q 2 =a-bP 2 =a-b(1-t)P, the company's profits 
User Utility Analysis
Because two kinds of subsidies for the user the result is the same, differences are only different subsidies, so user utility is consistent with the fixed amount of subsidy. , the user to select the Mobike for the convenience and comfort of the utility is greater than the difference between the two prices, the difference between the utility and can make up for that extra pay a higher price, the user will give preference to Mobike; On the contrary ,users choose other public bicycle. , Model has only one Nash equilibrium (subsidies, use), the user will use the bicycle if the company choose to subsidies, at this time the company has a certain income, but not more.
Equilibrium Strategy
When U total mo -U total other <U 1 mo -U 1 other , Users will choose the other similar public bicycle, there is only one Nash equilibrium (not subsidies, do not use), Mobike eventually will exit the market.
Two Kinds of Subsidies of Price Difference Strategy and Model results

The Price Difference under the Two Kinds of Subsidies Policy
When the user is subsidized at a fixed amount, and fix 2(a b ) = 3b S P + , the company can reach an equilibrium, namely whether the user is subsidized, the company can earn the same benefits, D 1 =D 1 0 ; Similarly, if the user is subsidized at a fixed proportion, , model is the optimal Nash equilibrium (not subsidies, use), at this point the company get the best economic benefits.
when Mobike give a certain proportion subsidies for users, , Mobike will adopt a fixed proportion to expand market share and achieve better economic benefits; when 3b t 2a 2b
,Mobike will adopt fixed amount S to subsidies users.
Model Results and Suggestions
In the short term, Mobike company use subsidy policy can quickly improve user utilization, Mobike must choose reasonable way of subsidies, in order to attract users, grab market share. The long term, the Mobike company cannot just rely on subsidies policy for long-term success, suggested the Mobike company set the prise between -U 1 ,users will choose Mobike. The company get long-term stable profitability. The long term, the company should develop diversified ways of profit. Mobike company should learn the experience of the domestic and foreign counterparts, improve comfort and convenience, increase the coverage of the vehicles measures, let user preferred Mobike in short-distance travel. Then Mobike company should combine body advertising, system development, model output and so on to expand profit way, step by step to lower the price of users, make consumers free of charge.
The government should actively play a role of publicity and coordination, and continue to coordinate users, thanks to the company and other interest groups such as the relationship between the rivals,safeguard the legitimate interests of the company.
